Tuesday, May 10, 2011

Amy Antonini, The Muslim Brotherhood

The Muslim Brotherhood: A Global Islamist Movement Trapped by the Nation-State

By Amy Antonini

Throughout the 20th and 21st century the rising power of Islamism has been affecting the global sphere. Now more than ever, some members of the Muslim community are aiming to create a world caliphate and have more and more political authority. Within the Islamist movement, one of the most powerful groups is the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). The MB has branches all over the world and considers the movement as fighting for Islamism. However, although it is considered a global movement, the question of if the group really transcends borders is present. This essay will first look at the beginnings of the MB, with its foundation in Egypt and the evolution of the Egyptian MB. It will then look at the global Islamist movement as a whole. From there it will turn to the MB as a transnational movement and what defines and shapes the movements in certain nation-states. This essay will look at two case studies of the MB in Palestine and Syria. Finally it will consider two definitions of transnational organizations to prove that the MB does not transcend transnational borders. The MB should be considered a part of the global Islamist movement, however as an organization, its functions and branches do not work transnationally.



The founder of the MB, considered the pioneer of Islamist movements in the Arab world, was an Egyptian teacher named Hasan al-Banna.1 The foundations of the Muslim Brotherhood can be found in al-Banna’s memoirs as he cites the horrible injustice and inequality between the Egyptians and the Europeans in a region that housed the Suez Canal Company at Isma’iliyya. Al-Banna stated, “We determined on solemn oath that we should live as brothers, work for the glory of Islam and launch jihad for it.”2 Thus the mandate for the beginning of the Muslim Brotherhood was born. In the document, “Between Yesterday and Today,” written by al-Banna, the Muslim Brotherhood’s mission and ideology was formed and documented. The principles of the Muslim Brotherhood are as follows, in a summarized form. God is the almighty and it is with his will and inheritance that the Muslim Brotherhood exists. The Brotherhood does not want to rule the world or inherit the land because it is God’s, however, they aim to unchain Islam from foreign oppression and abuse while creating a free Islamic state. They aim to free Egyptians from foreign influence while focusing on education, alleviating poverty, ignorance, disease and crime, all while managing a state that follows Islamic Sacred Law. The Brotherhood hopes to fulfil these aims primarily by deep faith, precise organization and uninterrupted work. Although there might be opposition, it is important to tackle these obstacles and persevere. These memoirs and documents cite the beginning of one of the most active movements in Islamism in the modern world.

Since its inception, the MB has undergone shifts and has changed dramatically leading to fractions in the organization. The Egyptian MB is considered the roots of the overall movement and its branches. Up until the 1970s, the Egyptian MB was considered radical and used violence in its mandate.3 The MB’s radicalism was a result of the 1930s and 1940s when the Zionists colonized the British Mandate of Palestine and the Palestinians were ignored as the displaced Jews of World War II and their struggles were brought to the centre of the international sphere. The Brotherhood became divided within itself, as there was an outer sphere of sympathizers, a ring of the most committed and knowledgeable, a central group of dedicated units and finally a more secretive group that practised violence. In 1941, members of the Brotherhood ran for office, however in 1948, when Palestine was partitioned and created the Jewish state of Israel, the Brotherhood focused on dismantling the Egyptian monarchy due to their poor performance in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. When the Prime Minister Mahmud al-Nuqrashi discovered the MB’s attempts at assassinating prominent members of the Egyptian government, the group was banned. From the dismantling of the Brotherhood came different sects with different vocations.4 The takfris were focused on determining the true meaning of being a Muslim and while the Ikhwan focused on democracy and political authority. When the MB was banned, members went underground and many younger people that were involved with the group separated themselves and created smaller terror groups.5 Radicals began to converge outside the Brotherhood and were focused on taking over regimes in the Muslim world. They looked to the Sharia to run the government and considered this the only option.6 Thus the members of the original Egyptian MB were scattered and later resurfacing as either part of the renewed MB in Egypt or members of other branches of the movements.
Islamism as a global movement is largely dependent on the domestic factors of the state in which they are situated. This is evidenced through the evolution of the Egyptian MB and is also reflected within other branches. Valentine M. Moghadam describes the purpose of Islamism: “Its overarching goal is the establishment or reinforcement of Islamic laws and norms as the solution to economic, political and cultural crises.”7 However, she goes on to say that Islamist movement vary in their efforts to achieve their objectives, including different approaches and campaigns. This is due to the fact that Islamism is a product of different historical instances that shape the movement.8 These historical events range from colonialism to the creation of nation-states. They are also shaped by the factures of the political system including, resources that are ready for use to mobilize. Therefore, although the Islamism is considered a global movement, its basis, structure and ideology are formed through or because of the nation-state. Moghadam supports this idea writing: “We may refer to a global Islamist movement even though many movements are locally or nationally based. The term “global” describes the scale, scope and reach of Islamism, and acknowledges that many Islamists engage in cross-border communication, coordination, solidarity, and direct action.”9 The following argument is also supported by Katerina Dalacoura as she states, “Transnational links may help in the spread of the Islamist message throughout the region and contribute to the political ascendancy of Islamist movement. But despite their professed ideology, the Islamists in each country seek to take over power in their own states.”10 The domestic political, social and economic issues are the catalysts that spark Islamist movements to revolt to change the societies in which they are located. In this way, the MB as an Islamic movement is no different.

MB branches mostly focus themselves on the rise of Islamism within the states that they are headquartered. Barry Rubin echoes this sentiment: “The Brotherhoods in each country are independent of each other; they usually do not use terrorism; they often follow different policies adapted to their surroundings; and they often try to avoid publicity.”11 Rubin goes on to say that although branches of the MB share the common name, they work independently of each other and there is little to no coordination among them. Rubin suggests that although Brotherhood leaders back each other there is very little applied support or action. In fact, when it comes to issues of concern the Brotherhoods collectively agree on stances regarding Iraq and Palestine but otherwise they work from within their own state. This is echoed by Abd-al-Majid alDhunaybat, the head of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, who claims that the idea that there is an international organization is considered to be true only because of enemies of the Brotherhood. He says, “Each country has its own exclusive organizational and political nature and relations with the state in which it exists. This gathering has no binding capacity regarding any domestic decision.”12 Therefore, this essay will test this hypothesis by using case studies of the MB in Palestine and Syria. It will look at the domestic economic, social and political issues in order to discover whether the MB has transcended borders or if it is identified by nation-states.

The branch of the MB that formed in Palestine and later came to be known as Hamas, was largely due to the Israeli occupation and the domestic struggle against Zionists. Al-Banna sent his brother Abd al-Rahman al-Banna to Palestine in 1935 to start the Muslim Brotherhood.13 Differing from other Islamist groups and branches of MB, the MB in Palestine had two other influential leaders in their movement. First was Sayyid Qutb who was a father of revolutionary Islam and promoted opposition to power. The other was Izz al-Din al-Qassam who fought on behalf on Palestine in the first armed resistance in 1935. The Ikhwan, which means brotherhood, a sect of the original MB, began to mobilize in Palestine after World War II.14 On May 6, 1946 a Central Office in Jerusalem was created however shortly after in 1948 when Israel was created the organization was split. The Egyptian military headed an organization in Gaza while Jordan headed one in the West Bank. Since Israeli occupation in 1967, economic prosperity grew however the Palestinians were subjected to horrible working and living conditions, as the Israelis who were in power, considered the Palestinians invaluable. The Palestinians had to cross into Israel to work and they were seen as reminders to the Israelis that they had occupied land that was not theirs. Islamic leaders in the community and in Ikhwan were worried about the possibility of Israeli influence on Palestinians, including the lazy and immoral customs Israelis practiced. Thus a sense of Palestinian nationalism began to grow and resistance movements began to emerge; however the Israeli government were quick to resist the movements.

The MB in Palestine fought back from early attempts at destruction and grew stronger due to growing authority of the Israelis and the peace mediations surrounding them. They considered themselves the resistance to the ruling Israeli power, representing the voice of the Palestinians. President Anwar Sadat of Egypt was engaging in the Camp David Accords in 1977 and looking to make peace with Israel, thus the Palestinians were left to fend for themselves in the shadows of this event without the help from a long-term ally.15 The Likud government, which was in power in Israel after they won elections in 1977, began to encourage Jewish settlement in the strip and the Palestinians suffered from more Israeli authority. Before these events in 1966 a quadriplegic man, named Ahman Yassin, joined Ikhwan and became part of a fight to free the Palestinians from Israeli oppression. He focused on organization and preparation. He used his position as a teacher to build up Palestinian nationalism and recruit members for the resistance. Throughout the creation of the movement, Yassin and the Ikhwan focused on the role and position of Palestinians within the Islamic movement. The struggle for a sovereign homeland for Palestine was considered important in the overall struggle of Islam. In a secret meeting in Amman in 1983, the idea that Ikhwan must engage in jihad was agreed upon. In this case jihad referred to a struggle against the ruling Israelis to project Islam, whether it be violent or not. Yassin began to prepare and purchased arms however through this process the plan was revealed and Israelis seized perpetrators including Yassin. He was arrested and sentenced to thirteen years in prison, however he was released a year later. In 1986, the group finally decided to hold a protest in rebuttal of Israeli actions and soon the Islamic Center was formed with members of Ikhwan. On December 8th, 1987, riots began after a car accident and soon the Ikhwan in Gaza gathered to begin plans of action.16 The Ikhwan created propaganda to build resistance to the Israeli occupation using the name Hamas, meaning devotion and zeal in the path of Allah, for the first time, and in August 1988, Hamas was declared a wing of the Brotherhood.
The formation of Hamas in Palestine helps support the idea that the MB is not a transnational organization, but a platform for Islamist movements to perform within their states. Hamas came about with little to no help from other MB branches, and was solely a result of the Israeli occupation in the Palestinian territories. If there had been no Israeli occupation and authority, the likelihood of the Hamas being formed would be low. Hamas seeks control only within the Palestinian territory. It was born from the heart of the Palestinians as Palestinian historians, Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela state, “At the time and place of its emergence, Hamas appeared to address more authentically and appropriately the expectation of many, if not most, Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, thereby supplementing the usual interpretation of essential elements of Palestinian nationalism, such as “people,” “territory,” “history” and “interrelations with the Arab Muslim World.”17 This can be further verified with the creation of the Hamas charter, which describes its philosophy. Although Hamas considers itself a branch of MB, Ziad abu-arm says, “There is no doubt, however, that the charter pays little attention to the Brotherhood’s core goal of transforming society, placing far greater emphasis on the Palestine problem and jihad.”18 The charter states that jihad is the only answer to the Palestinian problem thus rendering peace talks useless. Even more recently, Hamas identifies its goals as liberating Palestine from Israel, creating an Islamic state on the soil, and promoting Islamic society.19 In order to further suggest that Hamas is a result of its domestic context it can be compared with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which is another example of a Palestinian resistance movement that works within a more international context. The PLO was born out of Palestinian nationalism during the Arab League in Cairo Summit 1964.20 It is considered a political force in the occupied territories and has sought out international recognition in its fight for the Palestinians. This differs from Hamas, which works mainly within a domestic context. In 1974, the Arab states as well as the UN General Assembly recognized the PLO and in 1986 it was considered a full member of the Asia group. In comparing the PLO and Hamas it is evident that the PLO puts international validity at the core of its goals, while the Hamas does not. The study of the Hamas in Palestine shows how domestic context shapes the ideology of the MB.

The MB in Syria differed from the Hamas as it turned into an armed resistance against the Ba’ath regime and eventually became outlawed and turned into an underground movement looking to regroup. The MB in Syria was formed in 1945 and through 1963 it was “a reformist social and political movement that sought to bring about the application of sharia through dawa and political work within the existing political system, and that participated in elections, parliaments and governments.”21 During this time there began to be a fraction between the members of the Damascus branch of the MB, who considered themselves to be middle class, conservative moderates who followed dawa and the MB from the North who were more focused on national struggle and armed resistance. Like the Hamas, the Northern faction of the MB was influenced by Sayyid Qutb and his revolutionist ideology and was considered radical. In the 1960s, the Ba’ath regime, which had come to power through a coup outlawed religious parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood.22 As Dunn and Hann state, “During the 1970s, the conflict between the Ba’ath Party and the Brotherhood developed into one between the state and the Brotherhood.”23 The MB swung into action and attacked and murdered officers and Ba’athist party members while staging strikes and bazaars all over Syria. The conflict waged wage on and in 1982, the Syrian army counterattacked the MB in Hama, one of the main cities from which they worked, killing 30,000 people. This event has been described as a full-blown jihad against the Ba’ath regime. The regime managed to execute the MB and dismantle them, exiling many of their leaders and members. Thus it had to reform and like its fellow branches of the MB continue to battle against the state, but as a movement in exile.

In its position now, the Syrian MB is looking for ways to regroup into a stage of renewal and to continue to oppose the current government and outside authority. The Syrian MB is attempting to look at its past and became an influential Islamic movement in its country.24 In its renewal, the Syrian MB is turning away from jihad in its own country and is looking forward to gaining political power. In 2005, the Syrian MB changed its strategy of trying to oust the Assad regime to one that looks for democratized and peaceful means in changing the political structure of the country. In 2006, it formed an opposition block to prevent further anarchy in the country. In August 2005, Ali Sadreddine Bayanouni, a member of the Syrian Brotherhood who left to England as a political refugee, was asked about the current state of the Brotherhood.25 He responded by saying, “The opposition parties regard the Muslim Brotherhood as the largest and most influential opposition force in Syria. The Syrian regime tries to frighten the West about the Brotherhood and our activities by claiming that any change in the country would facilitate the rise to power of Islamists.”26 Thus the identity of the Syrian MB has been formed through struggles for power. Similar to the situation in Palestine, however the Syrian MB was resisting its own state, rather than an opposing state. This shows that once again, the MB is formed through domestic situations particular to the state they are centred in.

It is not simply enough to compare case studies of the Muslim Brotherhood and believe that it is not a transnational organization. Therefore, two definitions of will be analysed in accordance to the Brotherhood. The first definition comes from Doug McAdam, during a presentation at the University of Minnesota in November of 1999.27 He defines transnational social movements as “organized, coordinated transnational collective action designed to promote change in more than one country with active and equal participation of actors from multiple countries.” In comparing Palestine and Syria, you can say there is little collective action between the two states in regards to the brotherhood. Although Syria supports the Palestinians and Hamas in their quest to regain stolen land and liberate its people, it gave very little practical support to Hamas at the time.28 This can be evidenced in the Hamas charter as it focuses solely on the struggle of the Palestinians and although it mentions the support of other Islamic movements, it can be described as ideological support rather than practical support.29 Finally, when looking at the final part of McAdam’s definition, it is certain that the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria and Hamas in Palestine have made strides and taken action within the constraints of their state. There is no evidence that the Hamas gaining political power in Palestine has led to other branches of the MB gaining political power, particularly Syria as it continues to struggle for power. There are still branches of the MB fighting for any type of political power in their states, or there are branches that do not wish to seek it.

The second framework for a transnational organization comes from Samuel L. Huntington, who outlines three major characteristics of a transnational organization. He says that a transnational organization must have, “large, hierarchically organized, centrally directed bureaucracy, it must perform a set of relatively limited, specialized and in some sense, technical functions and finally it must perform its functions across one or more international boundaries and, insofar as it possible, in relative disregard of those boundaries.”30 Although the MB may be considered large, it has little hierarchical structure and has failed at centrally directed bureaucracy. In the 1970s as members of the Egyptian Brotherhood were being released from jail, branches in Kuwait, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq decided to follow the leadership of the Egyptian branch under a unified leader.31 1982 saw the formation of the International Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood that looked to coordinate the activities and unite the branches. Opposition to the newly formed hierarchy was universal. Hasan al-Turabi, leader of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood said, “You cannot run the world from Cairo.”32 Another source evidencing the failures of the International Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood came in 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait. The organization did not object to the invasion, thus the Kuwaiti Muslim Brothers left the organization and withdrew their funding. Travel bans and other obstacles caused the organization to fail miserably.33 In essence, the other MB branches were not impressed with the centralized authority and opted to work individually. Brooke and Leiken say that there is no overall authority governing the MB as the attempt to create an international organization has failed. They say, “The Brotherhood’s dreaded International Organization is in fact a loose and feeble coalition scarcely able to convene its own members.”34 Overall, there is no hierarchy governing all the branches of the MB, they are merely linked by ideologies that are shaped by their national priorities.

Although the MB looks to promote Islamism throughout the world, it does not transcend borders. For example, looking at the MB in the West such as places like the U.K., the United States and Germany, the functions are much different to those of the Middle East.35 They look to integrate Muslims into societies and fight for religious rights of their Muslim communities, rather than trying to install Islam as political authority. The MB came to the United States in the 1960s with the immigration of Muslims from the Middle East and South Asia.36 The focus in the U.S. has been on education and aiding Muslim youth in the U.S. Several organizations have been formed by American MB members including the Muslim Students Association at the University of Illinois and the International Islamic Federation of Student Organization. These organizations are aimed at not only helping Muslim youth, but also integrating Islamist ideology into the American education system. Another organization, the North American Islamic Truth (NAIT), helps to provide Muslim Students in the United States and Canada. NAIT has ties to Saudi Arabia as it receives funding from the country to build schools and Islamic centres. Although these organizations that have formulated from the American MB have ties to other international MB branches, they have goals and plans of actions that diverge from most other MB branches. Thus, functions of the MB do not transcend borders, and borders are not invisible to the organization.

When looking at Islamist movements in general, the MB, the case studies of Syria and Israel, and definitions of transnational organizations, the conclusion reached is that the MB is more of a global Islamist movement than an actual transnational organization or advocacy network. As Jillian Schwedler says: “All religions possess a mobilizing capacity in their shared norms and practices, but it is religious identity behind the political mobilization of Islamic groups in very different social and political contexts.”37 Regarding the MB as one identity is sometimes a mistake and can jeopardize the legitimacy of the organization. Because the United States sees the Muslim Brotherhood as a sole identity, policy making has been hindered. Different MB groups are more open to working alongside the U.S. and these groups need to be sought out by Washington. In turn, this could help the MB and the United States in different global situations.

Bibliography
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Altman, Israeli Elaid, “Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement: 1928-2007,” Research Monographs on the Muslim World, 2(2) 2009.
Baran, Zeyno. “The Muslim Brotherhood’s U.S. Network,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Vol. 6, 2008.
Brooke, Steven and Robert S. Leiken. “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 2, March 2007.
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Dunn, Elizabeth and C.M. Hann. Civil Society: Challenging Western Models. London, U.K.: Routledge, 1993.
Hamas Charter 1988, The Charter of Allah: The Platform of the Islamic Resistance Movement. Retrieved from: http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/www.thejerusalemfund.org/carryover/documents/charter.html [Online] last visited, March 31st, 2011.
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Mishal Shaul and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence and Coexistance. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006.
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Tamini, Azam. Hamas: A History from Within. Massachusetts: Olive Branch Press, 2007.
The Battle within Syria: An Interview with Muslim Brotherhood Leader Ali Bayanouni, Terrorism Monitor 3(16), August 11th, 2005.
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Vidino, Lorenzo. The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010.

1 John Calvert, Islamism (U.S.: Greenwood Press, 2008), 15.
2 Ibid.
3 Juan Cole, Engaging the Muslim World (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), 45-55.
4 Steven Brooke and Robert S. Leiken, “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 2 (March 2007), 109.
5 Cole, Engaging the Muslim World, 49.
6 Brooke and Leiken, “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood,” 109.
7 Valentine M. Moghadam, Globalization and Social Movements: Islamism, Feminism, and the Global Justice Movement (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2009) 37-61.
8 Jillian Schwedler, “Islamic Identity: Myth, Menace or Mobilizer?” SAIS Review, 21(2) (2001): 8.
9 Moghadam, Globalization and Social Movements, 46.
10 Katerina Dalacoura, “Islamist Movements as Non-state Actors and their Relevance to International Relations” in Non-state Actors and World Politics, ed. Josselin, Daphne, Wallce and William (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2001) 234-249.
11 Barry Rubin, The Muslim Brotherhood: The Organization and Policies of a Global Islamist Movement (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), introduction.
12 Ibid., 10.
13 Ziad abu-amr, “Hamas: A Historical and Political Background,” Journal of Palestine Studies 22(4) (1993), 2.
14 Azzam Tamini, Hamas: A History from Within (Massachusetts: Olive Branch Press, 2007), 12.
15 Ibid., 14.
16 Abu-amr, “Hamas: A Historical and Political Background,” 10.
17 Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence and Coexistance (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 15.
18 Abu-amr, “Hamas: A Historical and Political Background,” 12.
19 Shaul Mishal, “The Pragmatic Dimension of the Palestinian Hamas: A Network Perspective,” Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 29, No. 4 (2003), 570.
20 Muhammad Muslih, “Palestinian Civil Society,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 47, No. 2 (1993), 262.
21 Israeli Elaid Altman, “Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement: 1928-2007,” Research Monographs on the Muslim World, 2(2) (2009), 30.
22 C.M. Hann and Elizabeth Dunn, Civil Society: Challenging Western Models, 166.
23 Ibid.
24 Altman, “Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement: 1928-2007,” 36
25 The Battle within Syria: An Interview with Muslime Brotherhood Leader Ali Bayanouni, Terrorism Monitor 3(16), August 11th, 2005.
26 Ibid.
27 Jeff Haynes, “Transnational Religious Actors and International Politics,” Third World Quarterly 22(2) (2001), 156.
28 Altman, “Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement: 1928-2007, 36.
29 Hamas Charter 1988, The Charter of Allah: The Platform of the Islamic Resistance Movement. Retrieved from: http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/www.thejerusalemfund.org/carryover/documents/charter.html [Online] last visited, March 31st, 2011.
30 Samuel P. Huntington, “Transnational Organizations in World Politics,” World Politics 25(3) (1973), 334.
31 Lorenzo Vidino, “The Global Muslim Brotherhood: Myth or Reality?” HSPI Issue Brief 10 (2011).
32 Hasan al-Turbai, quoted in Brooke and Robert S. Leiken, “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood,” 115.
33 Vidino, “The Global Muslim Brotherhood: Myth or Reality?”
34 Brooke and Leiken, “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood,” 115.
35 Lorenzo Vidino, The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 1-30.
36 Zeyno Baran, “The Muslim Brotherhood’s U.S. Network,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Vol. 6 (2008), 98.
37 Schwedler, “Islamic Identity: Myth, Menace or Mobilizer,” 2.

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