By Joshua Filion
In modern history, one of the greatest threats to both state sovereignty and security is that of organized crime. Organized crime thrives in both legitimate and illegitimate markets and, as a consequence, produces individuals who are wealthy, influential and, above all, ruthless in their pursuit of affluence. When one examines the various groups who partake in organized crime, it is obvious that no organization is more ruthless and more successful than the Russian mafia. This paper shall seek to demonstrate that the Russian mafia is a) an NGO with extensive international reach and b) that the decentralized structure of certain gangs is crucial to this success.
It will begin with an overview of Soviet era crime and how that culture contributed to the rise of organized crime in post-Soviet Russia. It will then examine how the Russian mafia built on this history of crime and stepped into the power vacuum left by the collapse of the oppressive Soviet system. Finally, the specific case of Semion Mogilevich will be used to demonstrate the global influence of the Russian mafia as an economic force.
To understand the Russian mafia it is first necessary to clearly define what exactly the term “Russian mafia” means. The Russian mafia is not a single, monolithic organization with a unified hierarchy; rather, it refers to a cartel of organized crime groups located in Russia and the former Soviet republics. Gangs such as the Solntsevskaya Bratva, the Izmaylovskaya Gang, and the Tambov Gang are just a few of the larger groups within Russia proper (Glenny 62-63) though Georgian, Ukrainian and especially Chechen gangs constitute an important part of the Russian mafia as well (Finckenauer, Lesneskie and Sukharenko 247-249). It must also be understood that the Russian mafia is not a single entity and, in fact, there is significant infighting within the wider organization between rival gangs, such as the Solntsevskaya Bratva and the Chechen mafia in Moscow (Glenny 64-65). Such decentralization, although it leads to infighting, is also key to the dominance of the Russian mafia in transnational crime, as will be later demonstrated.
Having established what the Russian mafia is, one must examine the history of organized crime in Russia during the Soviet period in order to chart the rise of the gangs that now form the mafia as a whole. Arguably the most significant, and certainly the most quintessentially Russian, concept in Soviet, and then Russian, criminal culture is the idea of vory v zakone or, Thieves in Law. The title of Thief in Law is bestowed upon accomplished and well respected criminals who follow an underground, alternative honour code (Finckenauer, Lesneskie and Sukharenko 249). This code theoretically binds elements of Russian criminal society together by emphasizing attitudes of non-cooperation with the authorities and a single-minded dedication to the pursuit of crime (Finckenauer, Lesneskie and Sukharenko 248). The restrictive and pervasive nature of the Soviet state made non-compliance with authority the single most important part of Soviet criminal culture with violators frequently being murdered as a result of their betrayal.
Curiously, this exceptionally strict interpretation of the criminal code was beginning to decline by the end of the Soviet period which in turn led to cooperation between large-scale criminals and corrupt government officials in some regions (Handelman 86). This about face in doctrine can be attributed to the greater criminal shift from the older Thief in Law paradigm to the more modern, North American, concept of powerful criminal “businessmen.”
As a result of this changing paradigm, the post-Soviet system saw the Thieves in Law becoming figureheads of criminal organizations rather than remaining influential actors in their own right (Glenny 55). Despite this fall from significance, the concept of viciously punishing those who fall out of line and the symbolic importance of Thieves in Law remain powerful forces within Russian criminal society (Glenny 55). What this mixture of roles has created is a class of determined and ruthless individuals who, augmented with an entrepreneurial spirit, are able to survive and, indeed, thrive under harsh conditions.
One of the first opportunities that emerged in the dying days of the Soviet Union for Russian organized crime was following Mikhail Gorbachev’s economic reforms in 1988 which allowed Russian entrepreneurs the opportunity to establish private businesses, with restrictions of course, for the first time in 70 years (Goldman 182). In the early days of these reforms, entrepreneurs who discovered and took advantage of demand in certain sectors of the economy were finding themselves aggressively confronted by other businessmen who were willing to go to any lengths to force them out of business and seize the market for themselves (Glenny 54). Often this took the form of threats of violence but the once powerful Soviet police apparatus was on the wane and in Moscow the beleaguered police force was stretched too thin to investigate intangible threats (Glenny 53-54). For many of these new entrepreneurs, the solution was to hire gruppirovki or street gangs, to protect one’s business from the machinations and gruppirovki of rival businesses in lieu of assistance by a now absent police force (Glenny 54-55).
These gruppirovki were composed of “Afghan veterans, street toughs, martial arts experts, former KGB officers” (Glenny 54) and thus, were experienced with matters of combat making them necessary for any entrepreneurs interested in protecting their business. Kryshy, singular krysha, were gruppirovki that specifically operated as protection rackets and were often commanded, at least in name, by a Thief in Law (Glenny 55).
Curiously, while some Thieves in Law were hardened career criminals who had a very good understanding of the new world they were living in, there were many who had spent most of their lives in prison without actually doing much which led to some of these Thieves in Law being figure heads rather than real crime bosses (Glenny 55). A specific example of this can be seen in the case of Dzhemal Konstantinovich Khachidze, a Thief in Law who was invited by the, then nascent, Solntsevo gang to serve as their leader. Khachidze was a drunk and a drug addict who the Solntsevo portrayed as being behind the operations of the gang as a whole when in fact the only thing that Khachidze brought to the organization itself was the prestige of the title of Thief in Law (Glenny 55).
Such ineffectiveness was no impediment to the growing mafia however, especially the gruppirovki who, in the absence of anything even resembling a criminal justice system in the early from 1991 to 1996, stepped into the role of the police, making a fortune enforcing contract law under the new capitalist system (Glenny 56). The need that wealthy businessmen had for their own security as well as for enforcement of contractual obligations led to the rapid growth of several kryshy who were paid handsomely for their services and thus began to expand their criminal enterprises (Glenny 54-55).
The economic growth of these organizations was expedited by their harsh, realist based approach to business that emphasized personal gain and profit over all else, doing away with the code of the Thieves in Law in practice if not always in name. This ruthless devotion to personal gain at the expense of any other value or code of conduct created an organization that was based on transactions rather than family loyalties as seen in the Cosa Nostra, or a code of conduct as seen with the previous Thieves in Law. The result of this philosophy was the creation of a cadre of organizations that were “unpredictable, fluid, and dangerous” (Glenny 62).
One of the most dangerous and successful of these groups was the Solntsevskaya Bratva, or the Solntsevo Brotherhood, or the Bratva, an organization which, to this day, remains one of the most important members of the Russian mafia. The Bratva is notable for being the one of the first Russian gangs to emerge as a very significant player in the post-Soviet landscape. Based out of the Solntsevo neighbourhood in Moscow, the Bratva established control over two airports as well as the Yuzhny Port which gave them effective control over the entry of goods into Moscow (Glenny 64). This became especially useful when they began their first major business venture that is, importing cars to meet a rising demand amongst new billionaires in Moscow.
The Bratva has not been unchallenged in their pursuit of power however, especially in the early 90s when it had not yet established itself as a permanent feature of the Russian criminal landscape and was competing in Moscow for the Yuzhny Port. Their competitors for this port were the feared and well known Chechen mafia, a group that is arguably the most fearsome and ill reputed of all the non-Slav gangs in Russia (Glenny 64-65). Though the Bratva was eventually able to regain total control of the port, the Chechen mafia has remained a viable force in its own right by instituting something similar to a franchise system. Essentially, the Chechen mafia grants other gangs the right to use the name Chechen mafia which carries a great deal of weight and respect, and in turn those gangs pay for the privilege of the use of the name (Glenny 62). The Chechens ensure the strength of the “brand name” by insisting that each gang “carry out its threats to the letter” (Galeotti qtd. in Glenny 62) and promptly going after those that fail to make good on their word.
Yet despite these setbacks, the Bratva was, and remains, the most important criminal operation within the city of Moscow itself due to its prolific and diverse empire. Such diversity is evident by the Bratva’s seizure of eighty businesses and assets during the period of perestroika alone (Friedman 124).
Crucial to this growth was the structure of the Bratva which divided the organization into various brigades. These brigades would operate independently and would be responsible for their own criminal operations and earnings which would remain theirs and would not be funnelled up the leadership. Instead, the Big Four including Bratva founders Sergei Mikhailov and Viktor Averin, ran their own businesses and scams the caveat being that the brigades provided their services to the Big Four at no cost in lieu of direct payment. Disputes between brigades would also be settled by one of the Big Four who would then split profits with the brigades in dispute as a form of payment for mediating the dispute (Glenny 65).
The Bratva has now expanded to be a truly international organization with business dealings extending from the United States and Canada to Eastern Europe and Russia (Friedman 128, 244). It has not only been the Bratva that has expanded however, it is estimated that crimes committed by organized crime groups in Russia is now 8 times more than the number of crimes committed by those same groups in 1991, a clear indicator of a growing and dangerous menace (Finckenauer, Lesneskie and Sukharenko 249).
What’s more, groups like the Bratva and the Tambov gang of St. Petersburg succeeded in attaining monopolies or near monopolies over certain goods and services within Russia which gave them a gateway into the international arena (Glenny 70). What this meant was that these groups were finally able to function as global crime organizations rather than merely national ones.
This transition to the international stage was facilitated, in large part by a man named Semion Mogilevich. Arguably the most significant figure in the internationalization of Russian crime, Mogilevich’s gigantic empire of both licit and illicit business ventures has made him a potent force to be reckoned with. Both law enforcement agencies around the world and other members of Russian organized crime groups respect and fear Mogilevich. Reputed to be the most powerful and significant gangster in Russian criminal circles perhaps even the world (Panorama), Mogilevich maintains operations as diverse as prostitution, smuggling and art theft (Friedman 242-244). All of these ventures contribute to his vast criminal empire that extends from Eastern Europe and Israel all the way to the United States of America (Friedman 243, 247).
Mogilevich’s criminal career began as early as the 1970s when he was a member of the Lyubertskaya gang and was arrested for criminal activity undertaken while part of the gang (Friedman 240). Despite this past, Mogilevich’s first significant criminal enterprise was the fleecing of Jews fleeing to America and Israel in the 1980s (Friedman 241). During this time immigration control within the Soviet Union had become considerably more lax and a large number of Jewish Russians seized upon the opportunity to flee the state (Glenny 111).
Mogilevich took the possessions of fleeing Jews and promised to sell them at market value after which time he would send a portion of the profits to his clients in the United States and Israel. Rather than sending the money, he simply made the sales and kept the profits which resulted in a considerable economic gain for Mogilevich and set him on his way to establishing the prominence he enjoys today (Friedman 241). In early 1990, rather than remaining in Moscow, as Mikhailov did, Mogilevich instead decided to flee Moscow and used his Jewish status to emigrate to Israel in order to escape the gang violence engulfing the capital (Friedman 241).
Mogilevich made the decision however to not attempt to expand his criminal operations to Israel; instead he decided that he would keep Israel as a safe haven of sorts where he could lie low if pressure became too intense in other parts of the world. This decision was prompted, at least in part, by Israel’s policy regarding extradition, that is, the State refuses to extradite its own citizens (Friedman 241-242). This policy meant that Mogilevich effectively had freedom to do whatever he wanted abroad so long as he kept his nose clean within Israel itself.
This plan ended up being short lived however and in 1991 he married a Hungarian woman and re-established himself in Budapest where he proceeded to open night clubs in Prague, Budapest, Riga and Kiev (Friedman 242). This was followed by Mogilevich “selling partnerships in the prostitution business to the Solntsevskaya and Ivankov organizations” (Friedman 242) which naturally strengthened his ties to criminal groups within the former Soviet Union.
It was during this time in Budapest that the process of internationalization, which had began in Israel, started to truly pick up momentum with Mogilevich establishing ties with other, non-Russian organized crime groups. Two such groups were the Yakuza of Japan and the Italian Camorra, “arguably the cleverest, most cunning, and most violent of the four Mafia families in Italy” (Friedman 242). An ideal example of this partnership can be seen in one instance when the Italians passed counterfeit American hundred dollar bills to Mogilevich who then passed the currency through his operations into countries around the world. In exchange, the Italians were provided by Mogilevich with synthetic drugs and money laundering services of incomparable quality (Friedman 242-243).
This relationship with the Camorra and the Camorran Mafioso Salvatore DeFalco alarmed law enforcement agents and earned Mogilevich no small amount of prestige in the international criminal underworld. Cooperation between Mogilevich and the Camorra allowed both groups to expand their operations into North America and Eastern Europe respectively, much to the consternation of law enforcement officials in those regions (Friedman 243).
Mogilevich is particularly notable, not only for the diversity of his criminal empire, but also for the position of power he holds relative to other Russian crime bosses, all of whom pay him great respect. An example of this influence can be seen in his relationship with Sergei Mikhailov of the Solntsevskaya Bratva. Despite Mikhailov’s position as head of the most important and dangerous gang in Moscow, Mikhailov was wooed by Mogilevich in the early 90s and served as deputy director of Magnex 2000, a magnet manufacturer in Budapest owned by Mogilevich (Friedman 242-244). Indeed, Mogilevich often integrated Mikhailov, Averin and the Bratva as a whole into his operations, which, though always mutually beneficial, were dictated by Mogilevich.
For a significant period of time in the early 90s, Mogilevich worked closely with the Bratva and integrated Mikhailov and Averin into a number of his sham companies. A good example was Mogilevich’s Arbat International, a petroleum import/export company, was owned by Mogilevich, Vyaschelav Ivankov, then both Averin and Mikhailov at 50%, 25% and 25% respectively (Friedman 243). Their partnership was further expanded when Mogilevich convinced the Bratva to invest jointly with him in a jewellery business in Moscow and Budapest that served as a front for high quality art theft (Friedman 244). Mogilevich’s targets in this enterprise were as varied as Russian museums and art collectors to Eastern European churches and synagogues (Friedman, 244).
This partnership has been strained however, like in 1995 when Mogilevich likely betrayed Mikhailov, Averin and a number of other Bratva brigade leaders to the Czech authorities in Prague (Friedman 252-253). A meeting had been set up on May 31, 1995 between Bratva leadership and Mogilevich to settle disputes between the Bratva and Mogilevich’s organization. The meeting took place in a nightclub owned by Mogilevich who, due to a falling out between himself and Mikhailov, believed the Bratva would try to assassinate him. In retaliation, he informed the Czech authorities of the gathering who promptly stormed the nightclub, embarrassing the Bratva and pushing them out of the Czech Republic, at least openly (Panorama).
Yet, the most troubling of Mogilevich’s network is not that it includes, or has included, other Russian gangs, but rather that it includes a significant number of politicians and police officers. These individuals keep Mogilevich informed of the efforts being made by various governments to bring him down and do their best to block those efforts whenever possible (Friedman 246-247). The end result of all these efforts is a man with criminal operations in multiple countries and a network of criminal, political and law enforcement agents who ensure that Mogilevich is always one step ahead of everyone at any given time.
The success of men like Mogilevich, Averin and Mikhailov demonstrates the strength, ingenuity and entrepreneurial spirit of the Russian mafia. Beginning their lives of crime in a repressive system made them ruthless while coming of age in a time of lawlessness gave them strength as the harbingers of capitalism in a post-communist society. Decentralization of the gangs has made them more malleable and able to respond to a number of threats and evolving circumstances without feeling the limitation of family ties prevalent in other criminal organizations of their kind. Men like Mogilevich have made the Russian mafia international, but it is the decentralization and diversity of gangs within the larger mafia that has made the Russian mafia a truly powerful and fearsome force.
Bibliography
"The Billion Dollar Don." Panorama. BBC. 1999. Television.
Finckenauer, James O., Lesneskie, Eric G., & Sukharenko, Alexander. "Russian Organized Crime." International Crime and Justice. Manjal Natarajan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 247-254. Print.
Friedman, Robert I. Red Mafiya. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 2000.
Glenny, Misha. McMafia: A Journey through the Global Criminal Underworld. Toronto: House of Anansi Press, 2008.
Goldman, Marshall I. The Piratization of Russia. London: Routledge, 2003.
Handelman, Stephen. "The Russian 'Mafiya'." Foreign Affairs (1994): 83-96.
Natarajan, Manjai. International Crime and Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
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